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Abstract
The province of Quebec, historically known for its unusually high reproductive
levels, has in the past few decades experienced a spectacular fertility decline.
This more or less abrupt decline in fertility has corresponded with the socio-
economic transformation of this French-speaking province into a modern
society. This paper presents a path analysis of period structural factors on
fertility change in Quebec from 1941 to 1991. The results are interpreted in the
context of Quebec’s family policies and assess whether government can or
should attempt to increase fertility levels in Quebec.
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Résumé
The province of Quebec, historically known for its unusually high reproductive
levels, has in the past few decades experienced a spectacular fertility decline.
This more or less abrupt decline in fertility has corresponded with the socio-
economic transformation of this French-speaking province into a modern
society. This paper presents a path analysis of period structural factors on
fertility change in Quebec from 1941 to 1991. The results are interpreted in the
context of Quebec’s family policies and assess whether government can or
should attempt to increase fertility levels in Quebec.
Mots-clés: Quebec fertility,  family policy,  ferrtility determinants
Introduction
One of the most striking differences between the demographic histories of
Quebec, on one hand, and western European nations, on the other, is the much
higher levels of fertility of French Canadians at similar stages of demographic
transition. For almost one and one-half-centuries, between 1711 and 1850, the
crude birth rate in Quebec stayed above 50 per thousand population (Henripin
and Peron, 1972; Henripin, 1994).  Such levels of fertility are nowhere to be
found in the history of European societies – or even among the poorest of
contemporary developing nations (Henripin, 1954; Teitlebaum and Winter,
1985; Sardon, 1994). Although by the early part of the 1900s, there had been
some fertility declines
1, the fertility rate of Quebec still exceeded that of Canada
by a notable margin (Statistics Canada, 1993, 1997). For instance, while
Canadians in total had an average of 29 births per 1000 persons in 1921,
Quebecers were having 39 children per 1000 population (Statistics Canada,
1921).  By the late 1950s, the difference in rates had narrowed considerably to
29 and 28 per 1000, respectively (Statistics Canada, 1959).  With the arrival of
the 1960s, birth rates dropped considerably in both Quebec and Canada as a
whole.  From the early sixties onwards, Quebec birth rates have fallen behind
the rest of Canada, currently fluctuating at historic low points between 14 and 11
births per 1000, respectively.  Figure 1 shows that Total Fertility Rates (TFR)
were also higher in Quebec than in the rest of Canada until 1960, at which point
they began to slide below the national level.Where Have All  the Children Gone?
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Figure 1
Total Fertility Rates for Quebec, Canada, United States, England-Wales
and France:  1931-1997
Source:  Statistics Canada, 1999, 2001.
The collapse of Quebec fertility has corresponded with the transformation of this
province into a modern industrial society.  The rapidity and magnitude of this
recent phenomenon – which occurred after the late 1950s – makes Quebec a
unique setting for studying the relationship between modernization and
reproductive change.  This Canadian province is also of interest because of its
recent experience with birth incentive policies, an attempt at population
engineering that has been unprecedented in North America.   This article
presents a path analysis of period effects on Quebec’s age-specific fertility rates
from 1941 to 1991 (see Figure 2). We begin at 1941 because data for all the
variables included in this study are unavailable prior to this time.  Similarly, we
end the analysis at 1991 because although fertility rates are available for Quebec
until 1998, most of the other variables in this study come from the Canada
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Census and the 2001 Census is not yet completely published.  Although the
period from 1991 will be interesting to study when data becomes available, the
time period 1941 to 1991 is sufficient to assess the factors responsible for
Quebec’s fertility decline, particularly the sharp decline that occurred between
1960-1971. Moreover, this time interval adequately captures Quebec’s pre-Quiet
Revolution period (1941-1960) when total fertility rates were higher than found
elsewhere in Canada and the post-Quiet Revolution period (after 1960) when
fertility rates collapsed in this province. Since until very recently, the majority of
births in Quebec have occurred within marriage, our analysis also takes into
account trends in marriage rates because the extent of marriage or nonmarriage
and the timing of entry into marriage, are significant determinants of overall
fertility (Coale, 1969, 1973; Davis and Blake, 1954; Bongaarts, 1978).
Source:  Statistics Canada, Health Statistics Division, Health Status and Vital  Statistics
Section, 1921-2000, Births, Annual.
Figure 2: Age-specific Fertility Rates for Quebec, 1931-1998
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Modernization and Fertility Change
1
From a macro-social perspective, Quebec’s reproductive trends have been
shaped by a set of interrelated transformations over the last four centuries.  The
following are perhaps most salient: (1) a history of conflict with the British for
the control of Canada; (2) the dominant role of the Roman Catholic Church in
governing the lives of French Canadians and its eventual decline in influence;
(3) the transformation of French Canadian society from a predominantly rural to
an urban-industrial population; and (4) the ongoing struggle of this society to
define and maintain itself as a distinct cultural entity in North America. These
themes cover, to a large extent, the main features of the modernizing experience
of Quebec society.
The first permanent settlement in what is now Quebec was founded in 1608.
From that time until the early 1960s, government officials and the Roman
Catholic Church promoted an ideology of  “strength in numbers”, often referred
to as la revanche des berceaux – the revenge of the cradles (Baker, 1994;
Hamilton, 1995; Krull, 1996, 2003; Lavigne, 1986).  Held to be a means to
overcome Québecois subordination to English Canada, this pronatalist strategy
was essentially successful.  As Henripin and Peron (1972) have noted, between
1760 and 1960, despite losing approximately 800,000 people to emigration,
French Canada’s population multiplied 80 times.  In the same period, the
world’s population increased only 4 times, while that of Europe grew just 5-fold.
Moreover, Quebec’s exceptional reproductive rates caused concern in English
Canada, for “if the French continued to reproduce at the current rate, they would
eventually overrun the country” (Hamilton, 1995:137).
Until 1960, Quebec remained an essentially rural and traditional society.  A
range of issues not only delayed modernization, they allowed for the
maintenance of high fertility rates in the province.  First, in comparison to that
of its neighbor, Ontario, the largest English-speaking province in Canada,
Quebec’s socioeconomic modernization occurred slowly (Behiels, 1986;
Guindon, 1988; Laczko, 1995; Latouche, 1988).  Thus, in the late nineteenth
century, the Industrial Revolution took hold on Ontario; with the exceptions of
Montreal and Quebec City, on the other hand, Quebec remained largely rural-
agrarian well until before the outbreak of the Second World War.
3    In this
context, when contrasted with the rest of the industrializing world, it has been
suggested that Quebec was “almost completely cut off from important
nineteenth-century currents, particularly those of industrialization and female
emancipation” (Wilson, 1986: 147).  Delayed modernization, therefore, can be
attributed to the provincial government’s dedication to the Church’s ideology
and its vision of Quebec as a rural religious society. The influence of the Roman
Catholic Church cannot be over-emphasized.  Its control of education and ability
to influence the government’s social policies gave it decided influence over the
lives of Quebecers (Gauvreau and Gossage, 1997).  Not surprisingly, the ChurchCatherine Krull and Frank Trovato
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had a central role in promoting a pronatalist agenda and, thereby, reinforcing
traditional gender roles (Clio Collective, 1987; Gauvreau, 1991; Hamilton,
1995; Lavigne, 1986). Early marriage and large families were encouraged to the
detriment of individual socio-economic advancement (Clio Collective, 1987;
Hamilton, 1995; Trofimenkoff, 1983). Concerned about national survival,
concurrent Quebec nationalists viewed urbanization – or at least, sudden and
large-scale urbanization – and other aspects of modernization as threats to the
province’s unique culture and society (Hamilton, 1995). To cocoon Quebecers
from the outside world, liberal ideologies were discouraged. In this context,
because it would distract women from their maternal role and reduce the birth
rate, feminism was interpreted as a threat to national survival.
Yet, resistance to widespread social and economic change occurring outside the
province could not be sustained.  By the latter half of the 1950s, the impact of
these changes within Quebec were already underway because the “traditional
nationalist ideology of surviving as a Catholic, French-speaking, predominantly
rural people, no longer corresponded to the needs of an urban, industrial
population” (Laczko, 1995:19). The watershed came in 1960 when a newly
elected Liberal government, led by Jean Lesage, took power in Quebec City.
Quebec had been falling economically behind the rest of Canada; and within
Quebec, English-speaking Quebecers dominated the provincial economy.
Committed to a different national strategy – to modernize so as to preserve
Quebec’s unique culture – Lesage’s Liberals inaugurated a massive set of
reforms designed to give Quebec economic and social equality with the rest of
Canada, particularly Ontario.  Their program was viewed as indispensable to
French Canada extricating itself from Anglo economic domination within both
the province and nationally, on one hand, and from the overreaching authority of
the Catholic Church, on the other. Known as the “Quiet Revolution”
(Thompson, 1984), a new nationalist ideology took hold, “aimed at transforming
Quebec into a modern, secular, French-speaking society” (Laczko, 1995: 19).
4
Crucial to this transformation into a modern industrial society was a well-
educated population. The Lesage government, thus, ended the Church’s control
over schooling, putting in place the government regulation of education. In
parallel with this secularization, the educational system was expanded and
modernized. In this process, for the first time in Quebec, females were entitled
to the same education as males, including post-secondary education.  In fact, the
number of women pursuing higher education increased significantly.  In the
period 1961-1991, the percentage of women 20-24 years of age with a university
education increased from 4.7 to 27 (Statistics Canada, 1991). A modern
capitalist economy also required a labor force.  Liberal reforms encouraged
individuals to play an active part in such a force within Quebec (Laczko, 1995;
Rousseau, 1992). They had an enormous impact on married women, who
entered the labour force in significant numbers.  By the early 1980s, among the
employed, married women outnumbered women who lived alone
5 (Langlois,
1992).  Just as important, the number of employed married women still in theirWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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childbearing years rose: from 15 percent in 1961 to 74 percent in 1991
(Langlois, 1992:123). More than 50 percent of mothers with children less than
two years of age were employed by the mid-1980s; and in 1996, 70.3 percent of
mothers with children under the age of sixteen worked outside of the home
(Ministère de la Famille et de l’enfance, 1999: 1). By 1996, almost two-thirds of
two-parent families (64 percent) had both parents working outside the home;
and 56.6 percent of women heading single-parent households were in the labour
force (ibid.).
These diverse structural changes also promoted the values of individualism and
secularism within Québecois society (Krull and Trovato, 1994).  Organized
religion, chiefly the once powerful Roman Catholicism, lost even further ground
as church attendance decreased – compared to church attendance rates elsewhere
in Canada, Quebec now has the lowest rates in the country (Guindon, 1988;
Laczko, 1995).  Flowing from this development, values relating to the institution
of marriage have been affected
6. Dropping from 100 per 1000 unmarried
individuals in 1951 to an all time low of 37.4 in 1994 (Bureau de la statistique
du Quebec, 1996), first marriage rates have followed an accelerated pattern of
decline.  Indeed, by the mid-1990s, they were well below the Canadian national
average of 56.7 (Statistics Canada, 1995).  Not surprisingly, there occurred an
accelerated rate of divorce and common-law unions (Langlois, et. al., 1992).
Between 1981-1995, the percentage of Quebec couples living common-law
more than tripled (Turcotte and Bélanger, 2000:106-107).  More specifically,
throughout the 1990s, 80 percent of first unions in Quebec were common-law;
and by 1995, almost half of such unions within Canada happened in Quebec
(ibid.: 106). Coinciding with this upsurge in common-law unions is a sharp
increase in the percentage of births to unmarried women: from 16 percent in
1981 to 41 percent in 1991.  The majority of these births occur within common
law unions.  Quebec’s rate is especially high compared to that of Ontario’s
where, in 1991, only 17 percent of all births were to unmarried women (Belle
and McQuillan, 2000:117). Quebec now has the lowest proportion of married
couple families among the provinces (Statistics Canada, 1997).
Many Quebecers have preferred to restrict their fertility or opt to remain
childless (Langlois, et. al., 1992; Krull, 2000). By 1982, more than 42 percent of
Quebec men and women still in their reproductive ages had undergone voluntary
sterilization (Fréchet, 1992: 129).  Moreover, in the period 1978-1998, abortion
increased from 17.9 per 100 live births to 41.8 (Statistics Canada, 2002). The
1998 figure is in fact much higher than the ratios for the same year both in
Canada as a whole (32.2) and in Ontario in particular (32.0) (Statistics Canada,
2002).  And one report indicates that Quebec’s abortion rates are among the
highest in the western world (CBC, 2000).  The impact of this aspect of
Quebec’s modernization can be best judged by looking at the province’s TFR:
by 1987, it had dropped to 1.37 children per woman compared to the national
rate of 1.59 (Statistics Canada, 2001).  In the next decade, Quebec’s TFRCatherine Krull and Frank Trovato
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increased moderately – to 1.47 in 1998 – but it remained below the accepted
replacement level of 2.1.
Little doubt exists that Quebec’s fertility collapse since the ‘Quiet Revolution’
has, among other things, corresponded with declining marriage rates. Marriage
decline can be largely credited to the younger generation’s perception that there
are few gains to be realized through traditional matrimonial unions.  While not
completely eroded, this institution seems less central to the lives of many
Quebecers.  The decreasing desirability of marriage, particularly among the
young, may be attributed to three factors: 1) rising individualism accompanied
by changes in the value of children to parents; 2) changes in women’s roles and
aspirations; and 3) rising economic insecurities.
Theoretical Framework:
Structural Change and Fertility Change
An important problem in the demographic analysis of fertility is to explain how
broad scale structural factors impact on individual decisions to marry and to
have children. Numerous theories have been suggested in the literature and the
strength of this paper is that it attempts to incorporate these different theories
into a more comprehensive theoretical framework.
The conceptual model shown in Figure 3 provides a schematic representation of
how economic, demographic and social structural factors contribute to
explaining change in the perceived gains to marriage and, through this factor,
increase or decrease rates of marriage and fertility
7. We assume that as the gains
to marriage decrease in society, marriage and fertility also decline.  We also
expect that this factor will exert negative indirect effects on fertility through its
impact on marital instability and married female labor force participation
(MFLFP), respectively
8.  Following Becker’s (1981) theory, we also assume that
when the perceived gains to marriage are strong in a society, marital disruption
will be relatively infrequent, and this is conducive to couples having large
families.  When the gains to marriage are perceived to be low and the
probability of divorce high, couples will be more likely to desire small families
and to therefore place greater emphasis on controlling fertility.  This is
particularly true for women, who tend to be the worse off economically after a
marriage ends and who have traditionally maintained custody of their children
(Richardson, 2001: 225; Pask, 1993: 187).
According to Becker (1981), the gains to marriage for men and women are
highest under a traditional sexual division of labour.  Under such conditions,
married female participation rates tend to be quite low, and fertility is generally
high.  Conversely, in a regime of reduced perceived gains to marriage, women
are more likely to be employed, seek careers, and are keenly interested in having
few, carefully spaced children, with the aid of effective birth control.  The costsWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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of having a child, which can often include forgone or diminished income and
career opportunities for wives, are weighed against the benefits of having a child
(Becker, 1981; Butz and Ward, 1979; Easterlin, 1980, 1975).
In addition to having a negative direct influence on fertility, marital instability
can also indirectly curtail fertility through its positive effect on MFLFP.  When
the probability of divorce is high in society (high divorce rates), women are less
likely to give up their economic independence upon marriage, tending to remain
in the labor force (high MFLFP), which acts to depress fertility.  MFLFP also
indirectly affects fertility through its effect on marital instability.  Women who
are economically secure through employment will be more likely to leave
unhappy marriages than women who are not economically independent, which
again has an inhibiting effect on fertility.
Figure 3
Conceptual Model of Selected Determinants of Fertility Change
for Quebec:  1941-1991
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The major factors that are thought to affect the perceived gains to marriage are
demographic, social and economic.  The demographic factor in this analysis is
the sex ratio of unmarried males to unmarried females.  Imbalances in the
unmarried sex ratio can affect the perceived gains to marriage (Guttentag and
Secord, 1983; Veevers, 1994).  According to this theory, as the number of
unmarried males increased relative to the number of unmarried females (a high
sex ratio), there was more to gain through marriage for both sexes. This
occurred for two reasons.  First, when there was a shortage of unmarried
women, men who married enjoyed a higher status in society (Guttentag and
Secord, 1983:19).  They also received the sexual, domestic and child care
services of their wives. Thus, men gained more through marriage than by
remaining single and as such, they tended to be more committed to their
marriages (ibid.).  Second, since the pool of potential husbands was ample,
women had more to gain economically through marriage (Veevers, 1994;
Guttentag and Secord, 1983).  Under these conditions, getting married would be
more attractive than either cohabitation or remaining single.
Conversely, in a context where there are more unmarried women in the prime
marriageable ages than unmarried men (a low sex ratio), both sexes may have
less to gain from marriage (Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman, 1981). There are
fewer perceived gains for men because they can reap many of the benefits of
marriage without committing to a spouse (Goldscheider and Waite, 1986: 92-
93).  “Sexual libertarianism would be the prevailing ethos, shared by men and
women alike, although, because of the surplus of women, the options would be
greater for men” (Guttentag and Secord, 1983: 20). At the same time, women
being less assured that they would find a potential husband, would be more
likely to pursue educational and career opportunities to ensure economic
security. Achieving economic independence not only increases women’s sense
of autonomy but it decreases the necessity of marriage; living common-law or
remaining single become viable alternatives (Guttentag and Secord, 1983;
Turcotte, 1998; Veevers, 1994). Moreover, South and Lloyd (1992) found that
under conditions of low sex ratios and consequently fewer gains to marriage, the
probability of divorce is quite high. Consequently, “the more fearful the wife
will be that she will be abandoned by her husband and force to rear her children
alone” (Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman, 1981: 58). It is not surprising then that
women under these conditions would be more likely to limit the number of
children that they have or even to opt to remain childless.
Another major determinant of the gains to marriage is ‘individualism’.
Modernization changes the orientation of a society, from one primarily based on
collectivism to one primarily characterized by individualism (Lesthaeghe and
Surkyn, 1988).  As shown in Figure 4, rising individualism contributes to
secularization and the weakening of traditional values and belief systems. The
value of children to parents also shifts from a focus on quantity to one based on
quality, thereby inducing couples to desire fewer children (Aries, 1980; van de
Kaa, 1987).  Thus, as a process of modernization, secularization challengesWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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established institutions like marriage, family and religion; part of this also
entails a growing sense among people that small families are desirable to large
ones.
Figure 4
Conceptual Map of the Relationship between Individualism and Fertility
The economic factors considered in our model are the economic resources of
men and women.  Drawing on microeconomic theory, the gains to marriage for
men and women are maximized when there is a sexual division of labor,
whereby men trade their economic resources for the domestic services of
women (Becker, 1981; Easterlin, 1980; Openheimer, 1979).  Accordingly, the
perceived gains to marriage should reduce as the earning power of women
relative to men increases, or when men experience economic difficulties due to
fluctuations in the market.  In both cases, the advantages of traditional marriage
based on a sexual division of labor are diminished significantly.
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Data and Methods
The data for this study consist of a tabulation of age-specific fertility rates for
Quebec province as recorded in Vital Statistics publications for 1941 to 1991
(Statistics Canada, Births, 1941-1991). Several variables are included as proxies
for the various concepts included in our theoretical model. Except where stated,
the age-specific data for the predictors of fertility were obtained from the
quinquennial Censuses of Canada from 1941 to 1991.  Both year and age are
included in the analysis to control for the time trend and change in age
composition.  The age groupings are as follows: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and
40-44.
9  Estimates, derived from graphic interpolation based on a third order
polynomial function, were used for those years that data was unavailable (i.e.,
there was not a general Census in 1946, only the Prairie Provinces were
enumerated).
10
The three concepts that directly affect fertility in our model are married female
labour force participation (MFLFP), marital instability (divorce) and the
perceived gains to marriage. The proportion of married women who were
employed at the time of the Census per 1000 married women was used to
operationalize MFLFP.  The marital instability concept was operationalized by
the proportion of the married female population who was divorced at the time of
the Census.
11 A relatively high proportion divorced indicates an overall weaker
commitment to marriage and less confidence in marriage as a life long
partnership.  Both of these situations would have inhibiting effects on fertility.
A low proportion of women in the divorced state would reflect a stronger
commitment in the population to marriage.  Age-specific female marriage rates
were used as a proxy measure of the gains to marriage concept.  A high marriage
rate suggests positive gains to marriage; a low marriage rate indicates the
opposite.
The predictors of the gains to marriage include the unmarried sex ratio,
individualism, female economic resources, and male economic resources.  The
unmarried sex ratio is the number of age specific unmarried males to the number
of age specific unmarried females. A high ratio (above 1.0) indicates a surplus
of unmarried males, while a low ratio (below 1.0) indicates a surplus of
unmarried women
12.
The concept of ‘individualism’ was operationalized with factor analysis of the
following variables: (1) the proportion of men in the census who reported "no
religion"; (2) the proportion of women in the census who reported "no religion";
(3) the proportion of women with post-secondary education; (4) the proportion
of men with post-secondary education; and (5) the proportion of the population
reporting to have an urban residence.
13  The factor scores from the combined
index of individualism were used in the multivariate analysis.Where Have All  the Children Gone?
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Economic influences on the gains to marriage include male and female
economic resources. Male unemployment rates and female-to-male average
income ratios
14  were computed as measures of male and female economic
resources, respectively.  Economic gains to marriage should be highest when
male unemployment is low and female-to-male income ratios are well below
1.0.  Conversely, when male unemployment is high and income ratios are closer
to 1.0 (income equity), the gains of marriage should be low.  In addition to its
effect on marriage rates, male unemployment is assumed to also affect fertility
indirectly through MFLFP.  Historically, married women would be pulled into
the labour force during economic recessions and pushed out when the economy
recovered (Armstrong, 1990; Oppenheimer, 1979, 1994; Pryor, 1984; Rashid,
1986; Waite, 1981). Thus, while it is possible for the gains to marriage to be
high, temporary fluctuations in the economy might make it necessary for
married women to work. Even though employment may be temporary, it could
still limit fertility.
To estimate the specified relationships in Figure 3, regression equations were
computed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  Due to the existence of
reciprocal causation between married female labour force participation and
divorce, Two-Stage Least Squares regression was applied to calculate the
coefficients leading to these two variables
15  (see Namboodiri, Carter and
Blalock, 1975:492-532). Standardized coefficients (b’s) from all the regressions
were used to calculate path coefficients (P’s).  The path coefficients are
standardized; they range between -1 and +1. The larger value of a coefficient,
the greater its impact on a dependent variable.
Results
Table 1 shows the indirect, direct and total effects, and Figure 5 presents the
path coefficients that were statistically significant.
16  The results demonstrate
that female marriage rates (path F  = .44), the proportion of divorced females
(path J = -.13), and married female labour force participation (path K = -.58) had
significant direct effects on age specific fertility rates. These coefficients
indicate that high marriage rates, low married female labour force participation
and low divorce rates directly increase fertility rates in Quebec over the course
of the study period.  Conversely, low marriage rates, high married female labour
force participation and a high proportion of divorced females would decrease
fertility.  An overall R
2 of .96 was obtained when marriage rates, divorce,
MFLFP, age and year were regressed on fertility.  Female marriage rates (R
2
=.58), MFLF participation (R
2 =.13), and divorce (R
2 =.006) explain 72 percent
of the overall variance. Age and year account for the remaining 24 percent.Variables Direct Effects Total Effects
Marriage on Fertility (E*J) 0.0429 (F)  0.44 0.718
(E*I*K) 0.0765
(G*K) 0.1392
(G*H*J) 0.0193
0.2779
Married Female (H*J) -0.0806 (K)  -0.58 -0.6606
Labour Force
Participation on
Fertility
Divorce on Fertility (I*K) -0.232 (J)  -0.13 -0.362
Unmarried Sex Ratio (A*F) 0.2596 --- -0.4236
on Fertility (A*E*J) 0.0253
(A*E*I*K) 0.0452
(A*G*K) 0.0821
(A*G*H*J) 0.0114
0.4236
Individualism on (B*F) -0.1804 --- -0.2944
Fertility (B*E*J) -0.0176
(B*E*I*K) -0.0314
(B*G*K) -0.0571
(B*G*H*J) -0.0079
-0.2944
Female to Male (C*F) 0.1452 --- 0.2370
Income Ratio on (C*E*J) 0.0142
Fertility (C*E*I*K) 0.0253
(C*G*K) 0.0459
(C*G*H*J) 0.0064
0.2370
Male Unemployment (D*F) -0.3364 --- -0.3832
on Fertility (D*E*J) -0.0468
-0.3832
Indirect, Direct and Total Effects on Fertility for Quebec, 1941-1991
Table 1
Indirect EffectsWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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Figure 5
Computed Model of Selected Determinants of Fertility Change
for Quebec:  1941-1991
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Female Labour
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J=-0.13
A=0.59
B=-0.41
E=-0.33
F=0.44
G=-0.24
K=-0.58
Male
Economic
Insecurity
Female to
Male Income
Ratio C=0.33 I=0.40
H=0.62
D=0.58
Note:  Effects shown are net of age and period effects.
As shown in Figure 5, female marriage rates also indirectly affect fertility
through both female divorce and married female labour force participation.
Conditions of high marriage rates and low divorce were conducive to high
fertility in Quebec (paths E and J). Likewise, when marriage rates were high and
divorce was relatively rare, fewer women were engaged in the labour force, all
of which contributed to increased fertility (paths E, I and K). When marriage
rates were high, fewer married women were employed, which again was
conducive to higher fertility levels (paths G and K). Finally, high fertility levels
in Quebec were promoted by high marriage rates, low female labour force
participation and relatively few divorces (paths G, H and J). Combining the totalCatherine Krull and Frank Trovato
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indirect effects (.28) of marriage on fertility with its direct effect (.44), female
marriage rates have the strongest overall total effect (.72) on fertility change in
Quebec.
Concerning the predictors of marriage rates, unmarried sex ratios, individualism
and female-to-male income ratios had significant direct effects and, along with
age and year, explained 90 percent of the variance in the marriage rates.
Unmarried sex ratios had the largest direct effect  on female marriage rates,
indicating that marriage rates are highest when there is a surplus of eligible
males and lowest when there is a surplus of eligible females (the marriage
squeeze).  Individualism had the next strongest effect on female marriage rates.
This finding indicates that individualism is inversely related to marriage.
Unexpected results were obtained for the economic variables.  The results
indicate that as women’s average income increases relative to males, marriage
rates also tend to increase.  Although male unemployment had a negative effect
on female marriage rates (-.16), the result was not significant at the .05 level.
Yet, male unemployment did have a significant positive effect on MFLFP (path
D = .58) indicating that when male unemployment rises, more married women
work in the labour force, possibly to supplement family income.
In terms of total effects on fertility, marriage rates had the strongest effect (.72),
followed by MFLFP (-.66), sex ratio of unmarried individuals (.42), male
unemployment (-.38), divorce (-.36), individualism (-.29) and finally female to
male income ratio (.24).
Discussion
From this macro-level analysis, we may conclude that long-term shifts in
Quebec fertility between 1941 and 1991 can be attributed to changes in divorce,
female labour force participation, and female marriage rates.  Divorce and
MFLFP had an expected negative impact on period fertility.  Of these variables,
the strongest influence was due to change in marriage: when marriage rates
increased, fertility rates climbed; and when it decreased, fertility would drop.
This accords with the analysis of Caldwell, Fréchet and Thibault (1993) who
found a strong positive relationship between female marriage rates and total
fertility in Quebec between 1961 and 1989.
In the present investigation, the unmarried sex ratio had a strong positive
influence on female marriage rates, indicating that marriage rates respond to
changes in the demographic composition of the unmarried population.  That is,
when there were more eligible males in Quebec than eligible females, early
marriage would be perceived by both genders as advantageous. On the other
hand, when sex ratios in the prime marriageable ages declined (as it has in the
past few decades), the perceived gains to marriage weaken and marriage ratesWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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would drop.  This is congruent with the theory of sex ratio imbalances as
reported by Veevers (1994) for Canada, and by Guttentag and Secord (1983) for
the United States.
Our index of individualism is inversely related to female marriage rates,
representing one of the most important by-products of modernization on Quebec
society.  The modernization process has weakened the gains to marriage by
shifting functions normally subsumed under family and marriage to other sectors
of the society, reducing both the centrality and the reward value of marriage for
the individual.  The substantial decline in Quebec fertility in recent years is to a
large extent the result of rising individualism, and its impact on liberalizing
personal choices regarding marriage and childbearing. That is, as Quebec
experienced modernization gradually, and then more intensively from the onset
of the Quiet Revolution, people increasingly have adopted an individualistic
ethos to life and a generalized detachment, perhaps even distrust, of traditional
institutions, including church and marriage (Aries, 1980; Lesthaeghe and
Surkyn, 1988).  In this context, alternatives such as remaining single or
cohabiting, have gained in popularity (Langlois, et al., 1992: 111). Under the
new ethos of individualism, fertility decisions are predicated by individual
choice, based on personal considerations.
Male unemployment had no significant relationship to female marriage rates,
though consistent with expectations, the coefficient is negative, in accord with
the hypothesis that reduced male economic resources decrease the desire for
matrimony.  Male unemployment has a substantial indirect negative effect on
fertility through its effect on married female labour force participation (i.e. as
male unemployment rates increase, married women enter the labour market in
greater numbers, and fertility declines).  The effect of male unemployment on
fertility also operates indirectly in explaining fertility change through divorce
(positive), the latter serving to reduce fertility.  Through these indirect effects,
the male unemployment variable emerged as the strongest overall determinant of
fertility change in Quebec between 1941 and 1991.
Female relative earning power has a positive effect on female marriage rates (as
female earning power increases, marriage rates increase). This result may be
viewed as unexpected if female trading power is conceived strictly in terms of
domestic activities.  However, rising female relative income may represent a
stimulus for matrimony by males who would gain financially from the economic
contributions of their spouses.
Indirectly, female earning power raises fertility through its positive effect on
marriage rates. As female earning power increases, men and women would gain
more in marriage, the latter promoting fertility. Generally, economic
contributions by both males and females are important determinants of fertility
levels, though not necessarily in equal degrees (Caldwell, Fréchet and Thibault,
1993). In the present case, married female participation in the labour force has aCatherine Krull and Frank Trovato
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stronger and negative effect on fertility (Butz and Ward, 1979). As women
participate more in economic activities, their value of time increases and
therefore their opportunity costs for childbearing rise substantially, leading to
low overall fertility.
Although the model presented here cannot provide all of the answers, it does
point to some very crucial factors that are correlated with fertility decline in
Quebec. The context of this analysis also raises the question whether a
government can realistically alter the course of sub-replacement fertility. Our
analysis suggests that the factors impinging on fertility and marriage may not be
within government control but dependent on private behaviour. This conclusion
is also substantiated by Quebec’s recent failure to alter its fertility levels through
birth incentive policies. In 1988, the Quebec government implemented three
programs aimed at elevating fertility: allowances for newborns that, after
amendments, paid women $500 for a first birth, $1000 for a second, and $8000
for a third and each subsequent birth; a family allowance for all children under
18 years; and an additional allowance for children under age 6 (Regie des rentes
du Quebec, 1994).  Moreover, with the birth of a third or subsequent child,
parents received 27 weeks of paid leave, plus 15 weeks of federal maternity
benefits. Families with two or more children under age 18 qualified for a $7000
interest-free loan to help purchase a first home.  Overall, Quebec families
received almost $4 billion annually in direct and income tax assistance from the
provincial and federal governments (ibid.).
By the mid-1990s, given Quebec’s continuing low TFR, the incentive policies
were not producing the desired effects.
17 Although there had been an initial
increase in the TFR from 1.49 children per woman in 1988 to 1.72 in 1990, total
births after 1990 decreased.  Consequently, families with three or more children
remained uncommon. Having remade Quebec by urbanizing and industrializing
its society, the Quiet Revolution was now driven by a new set of values.
Mirrored in the desire of younger Quebecers for alternative life styles and self-
actualization instead of early family formation and childbearing, post-Quiet
Revolutionary Quebec possesses a modern society (Krull, 2003). In Hamilton‘s
(1995) piquant comment, “the simple slogan of the Comité de lutte pour
l’avortement libre et gratuit – ‘We will have the children that we want to have’ –
expresses what most women appear now to be doing” (p. 142). Birth incentive
policies favoring three or more children were increasingly viewed by modern
Quebecers as contrary to the needs of their families (Saint-Pierre and B.-
Dandurand, 2000).
Admitting defeat, the Quebec government jettisoned its pronatal policies in 1997
and put in their place policies designed to strengthen family life (Baril, et al.,
2000). These innovative policies had various objectives, which included
increasing government assistance to low-income families, facilitating a balance
for parents between home and work responsibilities, and promoting child
development and equal opportunities for all concerned (Ministère de la FamilleWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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et de l’Enfance du Quèbec, 1999: 4).  A pillar of Quebec’s new family policies
centered on the provision for a network of government-regulated, highly
subsidized (users pay just $5.00 per day; the government the rest) day-care
facilities.  The purpose of these facilities is to offer a quality educational
program for children from birth to kindergarten age (Krull, 2001).  Quebec is at
present the only provincial jurisdiction in Canada to provide universal
subsidized day-care; and this innovative program has recently been augmented
by ten innovative pilot projects designed to provide evening and 24-hour day-
care service, seven days a week (Dougherty and Jelowicki, 2000; Peritz, 2000).
Like many other modern societies, Quebec currently faces a low birth rate and
an aging population. Quebec’s uniqueness lies not so much with its current
fertility levels, which are no longer the lowest in Canada, but with the dramatic
way in which total fertility rates decelerated in a relatively short time period.
Although Quebec nationalists have expressed grave concerns, even anxiety, over
Quebec’s ability to sustain itself as a French-speaking society given it’s present
fertility levels
18, it is unlikely the province will witness above replacement
fertility rates anytime in the near future. Clearly, government cannot control the
factors that accounted for Quebec’s fertility decline and it is doubtful that
implementing policies with this goal in mind could substantially rectify its
current levels. On the other hand, Quebec’s new family policies, currently the
most innovative in Canada, demonstrates Quebec’s commitment to families in
this province.
End Notes:
1. Although fertility was significantly higher in Quebec than the rest of
Canada, it nonetheless had been declining since the 1850s.  However, it did
so at a much slower rate than it did for the rest of Canada.  From 1851-
1921, the number of births per woman in Quebec decreased by 23 percent
compared to a 51 percent decrease in the rest of Canada (Henripin and
Peron, 1972; Statistics Canada, 1993).
2. The following is informed by Krull, 2003.
3. Quebec society was not completely immune to the modernization process
prior to 1960.  For example, urbanization was taking place but at a much
slower pace than it did for the rest of Canada.
4. Although the vision of a Quebec society based on the philosophy of
liberalism and secularization was reflected in government-instituted policies
that promoted industrial development and urban growth (Behiels, 1986), it
is important to note that the changes that occurred were part of a greater
movement and may have occurred without intervention by the Lesage
government (Ingelhart, 1977; Lesthaeghe, 1983).Catherine Krull and Frank Trovato
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5. Although women’s representation in the labour force has increased
remarkably since 1960, the types of jobs they held changed very little; the
majority of women continue to be employed in the clerical, health, teaching
and service sectors (Clio Collective, 1987).
6. See Dagenais (2000) for an insightful assessment of the impact of changing
values on modern family structures.
7. We also assume that as the perceived gains to marriage decrease in society,
the prevalence of common-law unions increases (Turcotte and Bélanger,
2000).  Unfortunately, we were not able to include this variable into our
analysis since data for common-law unions by age, gender and province are
unavailable for the majority of the period under study (1941-1991).
8. We also assume that as the perceived gains to marriage decrease in society,
the prevalence of common-law unions increases (Turcotte and Bélanger,
2000).  Unfortunately, we were not able to include this variable into our
analysis since data for common-law unions by age, gender and province are
unavailable for the majority of the period under study (1941-1991).
9. The age group 15-19 was not included in the analysis due to too few cases.
10. Most of the variables included in the path analysis required some form of
estimation for certain years when the data was either not recorded or was
not recorded by 5 year age groups.  Although the estimation procedures
used are common practice, they obviously are not as accurate as observed
data.  This may have introduced degree of error in the statistical model.
However, graphic presentation of each variable (using the estimated and
observed data) indicates the expected trend.  Furthermore, the overall
empirical results are quite reasonable in the light of the expectation from the
theories applied.
11. Age specific divorce rates would have been preferred for the analysis, but
these data are only available after 1971, necessitating the use of prevalence
measures.
12. In using five-year age groups to calculate the unmarried sex ratio, we may
not have completely captured gender differences in the age at marriage.
Moreover, undercounts in the census of males between the ages of 20-24
may also affect this measure.
13. Male unemployment rates and the female to male income ratio were also
included in the original factor analysis but they were not included in the
principal factor. After preliminary analysis, it was decided to enter these
two variables separately into the model, rather than as one factor, because itWhere Have All  the Children Gone?
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is theoretically expected that these two variables have opposite effects on
the perceived gains to marriage.
14. The female to male average employment income ratio is the age specific
average female employment income divided by the age specific average
male employment income.  The income for each period in this analysis was
standardized using the 1991 Consumer Price Index.
15. The presence of reciprocal causation violates an assumption of OLS
because the error term will be correlated with one of the predictor variables,
which leads to biased coefficients (Norusis, 1993:236). Two-Stage Least
Squares regression was therefore applied for this part of the model.
Regressing MFLFP and female marriage rates on divorce consisted of the
following two steps: (1) female marriage rates and male unemployment
were regressed on divorce and the predicted values were saved in a new
series named ‘new divorce’; (2) ‘new divorce’, male unemployment rates
and female marriage rates were regressed on MFLFP.  A similar procedure
was done in order to calculate the coefficients leading to divorce: (1) female
marriage rates and male unemployment rates were regressed on MFLFP and
the predicted values were saved in a new series named ‘new MFLFP’; (2)
female marriage rates and ‘new MFLFP’ were then regressed on divorce.
16. It should be noted that the obtained Durbin Watson statistic for all the
equations were above the specified lower limit at .01 significance,
indicating that the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the residuals
should not be rejected (see Table D-5C, in Jan Kmenta's Elements of
Econometrics, 2nd edition, 1986,p.768). However, the value of the test
statistics was not above the specified upper bound. Thus, the test is
inconclusive and we cannot be statistically certain that the errors are not
correlated.  However, when differencing was used on the data, the Durbin
Watson statistics did not differ that much, suggesting that autocorrelation is
minimal.  Moreover, a visual inspection of the residuals was also done to
check for autocorrelation.
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